Iraq Study Group Turns In Term Paper

Update:  The full report is now available.  Reactions to the excerpts leaked earlier today are immediately below.  Comments on the full report are being added to the extended entry.

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From the bits I've seen thus far, I'm unimpressed.  Lots of bones, not so much meat on 'em.  In short, "Be more successful" seems to be the prescribed strategy.

Drudge has many related links, including these excerpts.

Our most important recommendations call for new and enhanced diplomatic and political efforts in Iraq and the region, and a change in the primary mission of U.S. forces in Iraq that will enable the United States to begin to move its combat forces out of Iraq responsibly. We believe that these two recommendations [?!] are equally important and reinforce one another. If they are effectively implemented, and if the Iraqi government moves forward with national reconciliation, Iraqis will have an opportunity for a better future, terrorism will be dealt a blow, stability will be enhanced in an important part of the world, and America's credibility, interests and values will be protected.

What recommendations?  Newness, enhancement, and change?  That's inspired.

The United States should immediately launch a new diplomatic offensive to build an international consensus for stability in Iraq and the region. This diplomatic effort should include every country that has an interest in avoiding a chaotic Iraq, including all of Iraq's neighbors. Iraq's neighbors and key states in and outside the region should form a support group to reinforce security and national reconciliation within Iraq, neither of which Iraq can achieve on its own.

Okay, there's at least one specific tactic: bring Syria and Iran to the table.  But this recommendation is more about what those countries should do, not what we should do.  It reminds me of the John Kerry line when asked in 2004 how he would've done things differently in Iraq.  "I would've brought other countries to the table," he'd moan.  There's a big gap between agreeing to speak with Iran and Syria (which may or may not be the right thing to do) and those rogue regimes falling in line and doing what we tell them they should do, even if we hold up a copy of the Baker-Hamilton report and point to the above passage.

More from MSNBC:

In seeking to influence the behavior of [Iran and Syria], the United States has disincentives and incentives available.

Ah, here we go.  Things that we can do to influence their behavior.  Okay, so let's hear it...

Iran should stem the flow of arms and training to Iraq, respect Iraq's sovereignty and territorial integrity and use its influence over Iraqi Shia groups to encourage national reconciliation. The issue of Iran's nuclear programs should continue to be dealt with by the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus German. Syria should control its border with Iraq to stem the flow of funding, insurgents and terrorists in and out of Iraq.

*Sigh*

Moving on:

The primary mission of U.S. forces in Iraq should evolve to one of supporting the Iraqi army, which would take over primary responsibility for combat operations. By the first quarter of 2008, subject to unexpected developments on the security situation on the ground, all combat brigades not necessary for force protection could be out of Iraq.

Okay, this is a prediction, not a recommendation, but go on.

At that time, U.S. combat forces in Iraq could be deployed only in units embedded with Iraqi forces, in rapid reaction and special operations teams and in training, equipping, advising, force protection and search and rescue.  Intelligence and support efforts would continue. A vital mission of those rapid reaction and special operations forces would be to undertake strikes against al Qaeda in Iraq.

Yes, good.  That sounds like a reasonable approach.  Once we get to that point.  The ISG believes we can get there by early 2008.  If that's their prediction of the existing trajectory, I guess it means there's not much we need to shift in order to get to that plateau in the next 15 months.  If instead that's their prediction of a hypothetical trajectory, based on the adoption of a new, more effective strategy, then we're still wanting for that strategy.  I thought that's what the ISG was supposed to yield - not what to do once Iraq is sufficiently stabilized for us to safely withdraw, but how to get from this point to that.

The report also dances around ideas that sound like increasing troops, drawing down troops, setting timetables, and avoiding timetables, all nearly simultaneously.

The Iraqi government should accelerate assuming responsibility for Iraqi security by increasing the number and quality of Iraqi army brigades. While this process is under way and to facilitate it, the United States should significantly increase the number of U.S. military personnel, including combat troops, embedded in and supporting Iraqi army units. As these actions proceed, U.S. combat forces could begin to move out of Iraq.

It is clear that the Iraqi government will need assistance from the U.S. for some time to come especially in carrying out security responsibilities. Yet the U.S. must make it clear to the Iraqi government that the U.S. could carry out its plans, including planned redeployments, even if the Iraqi government did not implement their planned changes. The United States must not make an open ended commitment to keep large numbers of American troops deployed in Iraq.

While they didn't use the word "timetable" or that strangely Euroized phrase "date certain" that everyone enjoys saying (is it just me, or don't we generally put the modifier in front of the noun?), I don't know how else to read "must not make an open ended commitment" notwithstanding the clause "subject to unexpected developments on the security situation" elsewhere in the report.

If Group's preference for timetables isn't clear (which, admittedly, it isn't), the following tends to sharpen the focus a hair.

The U.S. should work closely with Iraq's leaders to support the achievement of specific objectives - or milestones - on national reconciliation, security and governance.

The President met with Baker and Hamilton in the Cabinet Room to discuss the report, after which Bush made some preliminary comments.

"This report gives a very tough assessment of the situation in Iraq," Bush said. "It is a report that brings some really very interesting proposals." He also urged Congress to take it seriously. "While they won't agree with every proposal, and we probably won't agree with every proposal, it nevertheless is an opportunity to come together and to work together on this important issue," he said. "The country, in my judgment, is tired of pure political bickering that happens in Washington. And they understand that on this important issue of war and peace it is best for our country to work together."

We haven't seen the full report yet, so who knows what else it contains.  Maybe lots of actionable and novel ideas.  Time will tell.

But from the excerpts available thus far, I disagree with Bush's characterization that the report brings interesting proposals.  The proposals I've read by and large either are already being carried out, are for other countries, or are applicable only once the hard part's over.

Elsewhere:  The Allen Report, Michelle Malkin, Townhall, Hot Air, The Political Pitbull, Counterterrorism Blog, Heritage, Ace of Spades, Stop the ACLU, Flopping Aces

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Reactions to the full report:

This is interesting (and seemingly unwarranted) - the report issues a proactive proscription of implementing any of the ideas selectively.

It is the unanimous view of the Iraq Study Group that these recommendations offer a new way forward for the United States in Iraq and the region. They are comprehensive and need to be implemented in a coordinated fashion. They should not be separated or carried out in isolation.

Some interesting statistics:

Force levels:

• 60,000 fighters in Al-Sadr's Mahdi Army
• 141,000 U.S. military personnel in Iraq
• 16,500 military personnel among 27 coalition partners
• 7,200 from the UK
• 1,000 U.S. government employees in U.S. embassy in Baghdad
• 5,000 civilian contractors (employing 100,000 people, according to a new military census) in Iraq
• 135,000 in Local Iraqi Police Service
• 25,000 in Iraqi National Police Service
  
• 28,000 in Border Enforcement Department
• 145,000 in Facilities Protection Service (said to be unreliable and disloyal)

Appropriations:

• 2006 appropriation for Iraqi defense forces: $3 billion (less than the U.S. spends in Iraq in two weeks)
• Total U.S. reconstruction appropriation:  $34 billion
• Reconstruction money already spent:  $16 billion
• Total U.S. spending on the Iraq War: $400 billion
• Current burn rate: $8 billion/month
• Estimated eventual cost of involvement: "as high as" $2 trillion

That's a big number.  But I'm always a little skeptical when estimates are cited as being "as high as" or "as low as" such-and-such.  It's another way of saying, "Of all the people we spoke to, everyone's estimates (except for this one guy's) were below $2 trillion."  How far below?  What was the average?  The range?  Who was that one guy anyway?  Eh, not important.  Just remember the dramatic outlier was $2 trillion.

After finishing reading the Assessment section, I can say my expectations were surpassed (based on what I'd read in the leaked Executive Summary snippets).  The Assessment actually packs a lot of interesting data and insightful observations.  I don't know how in the world the ISG leapt from those data and observations to the conclusions and recommendations they reached, but the Assessment nonetheless is a worthwhile document that we can hopefully use to formulate more sensible, more innovative, and more actionable recommendations.

And wouldn't you know it, based on everything I've just read, I have a few.

I'll share once I've had a chance to Part II: A New Approach (is this a Star Wars screenplay?) some time tonight.